Abstract-The secrecy performance of a source-channel model is studied in the context of lossy source compression over a noisy broadcast channel. The source is causally revealed to the eavesdropper during decoding. The fidelity of the transmission to the legitimate receiver and the secrecy performance at the eavesdropper are both measured by a distortion metric. Two achievability schemes using the technique of hybrid coding are analyzed and compared with an operationally separate source channel coding scheme. A numerical example is provided and the comparison results show that the hybrid coding schemes outperform the operationally separate scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
The secrecy properties of the wiretap channel have been studied under a variety of formulations. Shannon [1] con sidered the model of a noiseless wiretap channel where the transmitter and the legitimate receiver share a secret key. Other works [2] [3] consider the case of a noisy wiretap channel where the physical structure of the channel is exploited instead of using a secret key.
The most frequently adopted measure for information theo retic secrecy in the literature by far is equivocation, or normal ized equivocation to be more precise. Wyner [2] introduced the notion of (normalized) equivocation for the study of secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel. This secrecy metric uses the conditional entropy of the source given what the eavesdropper observes H(SI E), where E here can be a noisy channel output or an ciphered text protected by a secret key depending on the setup. When the source is a sequence, this quantity is typically normalized over the blocklength, �H(snI E). Such a metric can be intuitively interpreted as the average statistical independence between the source and what the eavesdropper observes.
Inspired by [4] , other works [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] have taken a rate-distortion approach to secrecy in communication systems. Instead of using equivocation, the secrecy is measured by the average distortion between the source and the eavesdropper's reconstruction of the source by allowing the eavesdropper to optimize its estimation. There the goal is to design an encoding and decoding scheme such that the source can be delivered reliably (Iossless or lossy) to the legitimate receiver while a high distortion can be forced on the eavesdropper.
It may not have been straightforward to draw any connection between these two secrecy metrics until recent work [10] which has shown that equivocation is a special case of the distortion secrecy metric if the source sequence realization is causally disclosed to the eavesdropper during decoding.
Specifically, the distortion secrecy formulation with causal source disclosure fully recovers the equivocation secrecy for mulation by choosing the distortion function to be a log-loss function.
In this work, we investigate the secrecy performance of a source-channel communication system composed of an inde pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) source sequence and a noisy memoryless wiretap channel. By causally disclosing the source to the eavesdropper and using the distortion secrecy metric, it grants us the freedom of considering the general formulation of a secrecy problem, which can be particularized to the equivocation formulation if needed. A variation of this source-channel secrecy model was considered in [8] without causal source disclosure. Despite an important game-theoretic setting, such formulation does not render a strong enough secrecy criterion.
Previous work [11] considers the same source-channel model with causal source disclosure. However, only an oper ationally separate source-channel coding scheme was consid ered. Recent work on hybrid coding [12] and the likelihood encoder [13] [14] suggests a new way of approaching this problem. and Jp(Xj Y) to indicate expectation, probability, and mutual information taken with respect to a distribution P; however, when the distribution is clear from the context, the subscript will be omitted. We use a bold capital letter P to denote that a distribution P is random. The distortion between two sequences is defined to be the per-letter average distortion d(x n ,y n) = � "t d( Xt , Yt). t=l
PRELIMINARIES

B. Total Variation Distance
The total variation distance between two probability mea sures P and Q on the same eT-algebra F of subsets of the sample space X is defined as
Some basic properties of total variation distance are given as Property 2 in [15] . e. Soft-covering Lemma
We now introduce the soft-covering lemma, which will be used in the achievability proof of the joint source-channel coding scheme. 
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Ill. PROBLEM SETUP AND PREVIOUS WORK
A. Problem Setup (2) Given a memory less source and broadcast channel, we want to maximize the distortion forced on the eavesdropper (for estimating the source) while communicating the source reliably within a distortion constraint to the legitimate receiver.
The input of the system is an i.i.d. source sequence sn distributed according to rr� l Ps ( sd and the channel is a memoryless broadcast channel rr� l PYZlx(Yt,ztl xt ). The source realization is causally disclosed to the eavesdropper during decoding. The source-channel coding model satisfies the following constraints:
• Encoder i n : sn >-+ xn (possibly stochastic);
• Legitimate receiver decoder 9 n : yn >-+ sn (possibly stochastic);
The system performance is measured by a distortion metric de, . ) as follows: 
{PS t Izns t -l} ;1.=1
The above mathematical formulation is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
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B. Previous Result
Before introducing the new Jomt source-channel coding schemes, we first review the achievability result from previous work [11] of the same problem formulation with an opera tionally separate source-channel coding scheme. Although the problem was only studied for the case of lossless reconstruc tion at the legitimate receiver in [11] , the result can be readily generalized to the case of lossy compression as was formulated in Section Ill-A.
J(S; SIU 1 ) < J(V2; YIU2) -J(V2; ZIU2)
De ::
Since the source coding and channel coding parts of the above scheme are almost independent (with some technical details), we refer to it as the operationally separate source channel coding scheme -Scheme 0.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
This section is organized as follows. We first introduce the idea of secure hybrid coding. We then state the result of using basic hybrid coding (Scheme I) followed by its proof. We next state and briefly discuss the result using superposition hybrid coding (Scheme 11). Finally, we analytically compare Scheme 0, I and 11, and give a trivial outer bound for completeness.
A. Secure Hybrid Coding
Hybrid coding is a joint source-channel coding technique [12] where 1) the encoder generates a digital codeword from the analog source and selects the channel input as a symbol by-symbol function of the codeword and the source; and 2) the decoder recovers the digital codeword from the analog channel output and selects the source estimate as a symbol by-symbol function of the codeword and the channel output. It has been shown that this joint source-channel code is at least optimal for point-to-point communication. For the purpose of achieving secrecy, the symbol-by-symbol mapping (deterministic) to the channel input in the encoding stage is modified to be stochastic.
B. Scheme J -Basic Hybrid Coding
An achievability region using basic secure hybrid coding is given in the following theorem.
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where
for some distribution PSPulsPXISUPYZIX and function cp(-, . ).
The proof of Theorem 2 to be presented next uses hybrid coding combined with the likelihood encoder. The general idea is that under our choice of the encoder and decoder, the system induced distribution P is close in total variation distance to an idealized distribution Q by our construction.
Therefore, by properties of total variation, we can approximate the performance of the system under P by that under Q.
C. Proof Outline of Scheme J
The source and channel distributions Ps and PYZ1X are given by the problem statement. Fix a joint distribution PSPuISPXISUPYZlx, We will use Psn to denote rr� l Ps.
Codebook generation: We independently generate 2n R sequences in un according to rr� =l Pu ( U t ) and index by mE [ 1 : 2n R ]. We use c ( n ) to denote this random codebook.
Encoder: Encoding has two steps. In the first step, a likeli hood encoder PLE(ml s n) is used. It chooses M stochastically according to the following probability: n £.(ml s n) PLE(ml s ) = "" " ( _ I n) (12) D mEM /... . ms where M = [ 1 : 2n R ], and £.(ml s n ) = PsnlUn(s n l u n (m)).
Decoder: Decoding also has two steps. In the first step, let PDl(ml yn) be a good channel decoder with respect to the codebook {un(a)}a and memoryless channel PYIU' In the second step, fix a function cp(-' . ). Define cpn(un,yn) as the concatenation {cp( U t, Yt)}r =l and set the decoder P D2 to be the deterministic function PD 2(. § n l m,y n ) � ll.{. § n = cpn(un(m),yn)}.
(14)
Analysis: We can write the system induced distribution in the following form: P Munsnxnynzn Msn (rn, u n , s n , x n , y n , zn, rn, . §n) ,;;" Psn(S n )pLE(ml s n ) ll.{u n = U n (m)} n n
IT PXlsu( xtl st, Ut) IT PYZ1x(Yt, Ztl xd t=l t=1 PDl(ml y n )PD2( . § n l m,y n ). 
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Using the same steps as was given in [14] for the analysis of the Wyner-Ziv setting, it can be verified that the following holds: where o n --+ n 0.
2) Distortion analysis at the eavesdropper: On the eaves dropper side, we make the following observation. Define an auxiliary distribution (21)
In the second step, the encoder produces the ch an-Under Q(i), nel input through a random transformation given by rr� =1 PXlsu(xtl st, U t(m )). 
where Z· here can t j3 f j3 < R-I( U;Z ) go up 0 n, or any I(S;UI Z ) .
Consequently,
Note that ( 26) is a degenerate statement if R > J(Z; U). Also note that since R > 0, we have
Therefore, combining (18), ( 27), ( 28), and (19), there exists a codebook c ( n ) such that n
where E n = n (2exp( -nil) + exp( -n,2) + exp( -n,3)) + dmax(E1 n + O n ) -+ n O. Now we can bound the distortion at the eavesdropper by breaking it down into two sections. The distortion after the time transition j3n can be lower bounded by the following:
where k = ( 1-(3)n, j = j3n + 1, (35) is from (29), (36) uses the Markov relation given in (24), and (37) uses (31) and the fact that Qz i sdu i ( Zi' sil ui) = PZ1U( Zil ui)P SIZU( Sil zi, Ui).
Similarly, by repeating the above process by replacing Q with Q using ( 30), the Markov relation given in (22) , and the definition of Q given in (21), we can lower bound the distortion before time j3n as
(,pO i ( S,-I, z n )}i
i=l '>/Jo(z) An achievability region using superposition secure hybrid coding is given in the following theorem. 
for some distribution P SPvlsPulV PXlsUV PyZ1X andfunc tion 4>(-, . ).
The proof of Theorem 3 follows the same line as the proof of Theorem 2 with the modification of using a superposition codebook and the superposition version of the soft-covering lemma which was discussed in Corollary VII.8 of [16] .
Under Scheme 11, the distortion at the eavesdropper can potentially experience two transitions at j3n and an due to the superposition structure of the code.
E. Scheme Comparison
The relationships among Scheme 0, I and 11 can be sum marized in the following corollaries. To see this, notice that we can let U = 0 in Theorem 3. In fact, Scheme 11 simplifies to Scheme I if j3 � a. This can be verified by using the following assignment of random variables from Theorem 1 to 3: U +-UIU2 and V+-SV2 to show that the inequalities (3) and (4) satisfy the inequality (39), fJ = 1], and a = 1. The equivalence of (5) and (6) and function
This trivial outer bound can be verified by using the optimality of hybrid coding for point-to-point communication and the fact that the estimation by the eavesdropper cannot be worse than the a-priori estimation of the source.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We use the same example that was considered in [11] .
The source is distributed i.i.d. according to Bern(p) and the channels are binary symmetric channels with crossover probabilities PI = 0 and P2 = 0.3. For simplicity, we require lossless decoding at the legitimate receiver. Hamming distance is considered for distortion at the eavesdropper.
A numerical comparison of Scheme I with Scheme 0 is demonstrated in Fig. 2 . The choice of auxiliary random variable U in Scheme I is SX, which may not necessarily be the optimum choice but is good enough to outperform Scheme O. Scheme 11 is not numerically evaluated. However, because of Corollary 1 and 2, we know analytically that Scheme 11 is no worse than 0 or I. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This work has investigated secure joint source-channel cod ing under a general information-theoretic secrecy formulation. By using hybrid coding, we achieve better performance than a previously considered operationally separate source-channel coding scheme (0). Although a simple numerical example shows that a basic hybrid coding scheme (I) can potentially outperform Scheme 0, we have only managed to prove ana lytically a superposition hybrid coding scheme (11) can fully generalize both Scheme 0 and I. The direct relation between Scheme 0 and I, and whether Scheme 11 is strictly better than I are still open for further investigation. Non-trivial outer bounds are yet to be explored.
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